For the Palestinians, what is the impact of the Arab Spring? The revolution not only dislodged Mubarak from the presidency, but also changed Egyptian policy regarding Palestinians in Gaza. New Egyptian diplomacy has encouraged Hamas and Fatah, which had been in dispute, to seek reconciliation and has loosened the border control on humanitarian grounds. We focus on Palestinian voting attitudes in the wake of the Arab Spring. Despite the vast quantity of literature written about Palestinian politics since the first decade of the millennium, we know little about the determinants of Palestinian attitudes toward the divided governments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Fatah government, in the West Bank, increased in popularity after submitting a request for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. In Gaza, the Hamas government lost popularity because of mismanagement but won support through the success of its prisoner swap deal with Israel.
Introduction
The breakdown of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes occurred in the first months of 2011 through mass demonstrations against the ruling parties. It has since been labeled the Jasmine Revolution, the Egyptian Revolution, and, collectively, the Arab Spring. The name "Arab Spring" suggests that the protests spread across the Arab world including into the occupied Palestinian territories. One month after the fall of the Mubarak government, peaceful demonstrations, inspired by the Arab Spring, demanded that After Israel introduced the blockade, smuggling became Gaza's alternative.
Through the tunnels under Rafah came everything from building materials and food to medicine and clothing, from fuel and computers to livestock and cars. Hamas smuggled in weapons. (Verini, 2012, p. 59) The revolution not only dislodged Mubarak from the presidency, but also changed Egyptian policy regarding Palestine. The new Egyptian regimes have encouraged the parties in dispute to reconcile and loosened border control on humanitarian grounds. In Cairo, on May 3, 2011, the leadership of Fatah and Hamas presented a joint press release concerning a reconciliation agreement. The reconciliation seemed to be a direct result of the Egyptian revolution from the standpoint of both the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and Khaled Meshaal, the Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research -ISSN 2288-6168 (Online) Vol. "The domestic politics of Middle Eastern states are affected by their regional and international environments in numerous ways." (Gause, 2010, p. 49) . We have seen much interaction between domestic and international events in the region. These interacting political situations stem from the characteristics of the political systems of many Middle Eastern states built by the European contest for power before World War II. The unresolved problem of the Israeli-Palestine conflict is born from these systems.
"Perhaps no political system in the Arab world shows the sharp impact of international politics more than Palestine." (Brown, 2010, p. 385) .
In this study, we focus on Palestinian political attitudes in the wake of the Arab
Spring. This research questions the magnitude of the impact of the Arab Spring on the Palestinians. We wonder whether this impact led to an increase or a decrease in the popularity of Palestinian political parties. Does the Egyptian policy change in border control determine Palestinian attitudes toward Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip? This paper contains four sections. The first briefly reviews the existing literature on the association between foreign affairs and political attitudes. The literature review presents the theoretical foundations for the quantitative analyses, which are explored in the third section. The second section provides a detailed description of the data set for the study and of the hypotheses. The third section outlines and examines the hypotheses on the basis of quantitative models. The final section discusses the results of these analyses and presents the implications of this study for political studies of the Middle East.
I. Democratic Dominos and the Political Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens
The (Ezaki, 2012, p. 77) .
The overthrow of the Mubarak regime led subsequently to the rise of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which took power until the establishment of the next government and decided to permanently reopen the Rafah border crossing for passengers and ease the siege of the Gaza Strip on 28 May 2011 (Brownlee, 2012, p. 163 It is a well-known phenomenon for political scientists that successful democratization encourages the breakdown of dictatorship in neighboring countries. This is called the "democratic domino" (Leeson & Dean, 2009; Starr, 1991; Starr & Lindborg, 2003) or the "diffusion of democracy" (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Teorell, 2010) , and the Arab Spring is no exception. The democratic domino theory relies on the premise that geographic proximity plays a critical role in the spread of democracy. Although the theory provides some potential mechanisms for democratic dominoes, "a demonstration effect" or "learning" idea regarding the tactics and strategies of the successful countries is the most important channel, in our view, with which to do research into public opinion (Leeson & Dean, 2009; Simmons, Dobbin, & Garret, 2006) . Huntington (1991, p. 101) and did not take place in the region, in spite of the preponderance for wars and armed conflicts. The opportunity has come to examine the effect of the Arab democratic revolution on Palestinians as if it were a natural experiment (Stock & Watson, 2012, pp. 529-536) . Here, we apply the research design of intertemporal comparison to find The hypothesis is consistent with the interactive character of Arab politics cited in (Kawakami, 2012, pp. 213-249; Verini, 2012) .
II. Data and Methods
The data used for this study comes from two waves of the National Poll Survey in JMCC interviewers are instructed to go to assigned primary sampling units to conduct the 10 interviews per sampling area. Within each sampling area, the household selection method is based on a pre-defined route. Interviewers are instructed to follow a specific route when selecting the household. Since most population concentrations are not designed for development, nor is there a well-defined bloc system, interviewers, particularly in villages and refugee camps, are asked to go to a specific place (e.g., mosque, elementary school) to begin their route. They are instructed to start from that place and then take, for example, the fourth street on their left. When the street is determined, they are instructed to choose the third or second house on their right, then the following third house on the left, etc. The number of levels in each house is also taken into consideration, as is the number of streets where the household is selected.
In cities, the same method is used. The city is divided into neighborhoods.
Neighborhoods are also randomly selected, and in each neighborhood interviewers have a starting point; then each neighborhood is treated in the same way as above for the selection of households. As for the members of the household, respondents are selected using Kish tables. The Kish method is an objective procedure for selecting respondents within the household. Each household is visited a maximum of twice to locate the selected person. Table 1 shows a descriptive summary of the data for analysis. without the effect of an opened border. The sample in the Gaza Strip will be the treatment group because of the opening of the Egyptian border.
The difference-in-differences identification strategy, the difference-in- ) ). T means treatment group, C is control group, and number subscripts denote the first and the second period (Wooldridge, 2013, pp. 438-443) .
The set of the control variables includes socio-demographic characteristics, as well as evaluations of Egypt, the United States, Russia, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar as contributors to regional stability in the Middle East. According to the sociological approach of the Columbia school (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948) , demographic traits, (e.g., sex, age, education, and income) would correlate with specific political parties (Abu-Sada, 1996) . The countries on the above list appear to be major powers in Middle East politics, according to the literature, especially Gause (2010) . The pattern of assessments of the countries would be associated with the party identification of Palestinians.
III. Analysis
Beginning with simple examinations, The difference-in-differences part of the quantitative analysis examines Models 1 through 4 by multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable of the statistical model is four possible outcomes of voting behavior in this coding: (1) Hamas, (2) Fatah, (3) other parties, and (4) not vote. Table 4 shows the partial regression coefficient and its statistical significance for each variable on voting probability for Hamas as opposed to no vote. Table 5 reports the results in the case of probability for Fatah. The results of voting for other parties and not voting are considered a single base category because other political parties are small and not important without Hamas and Fatah for considering Palestinian politics from a broad perspective. Table 4 indicates that the coefficient of Year_Gaza on voting for Hamas is statistically significant in Model 1, 2, and 4 but the significance of the interaction disappears in Model 3. However, each sign of the difference-in-differences estimator (δ) is consistently negative in Table 4 . In the case of voting for Fatah, Table 5 presents the effect of the interaction estimated as the same as it is for Hamas in each model. Figure 1 gives an intuitive understanding of the DD model on the voting attitudes toward Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research -ISSN 2288-6168 (Online) Vol. Fatah supporters prefer the diplomacy of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in tackling political issues and thus contributing to regional stability. Table 5 
IV. Discussion
This study examined the policy impact of the post-Mubarak regime on the voting attitudes of Palestinians. In summary of the simple analysis in Changes in Egyptian diplomacy appear to have had a negative effect on the attitudes of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and it seems to have decreased the popularity of both
Hamas and Fatah in Gaza.
We make an inference from the finding, which might reflect that the policy change was spurious and restrictive. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the successor to Mubarak, made it a priority to maintain the peace treaty with Israel to preserve regional order. Even the Morsi government did not establish diplomatic relations with Gaza in order to avoid confusion and maintain ties with the United States.
As Verini (2012) notes, though Egypt reopened the Rafah border crossing, it still prevented young males in Gaza from coming through. The elected president, Mohamed
Morsi, who wished to keep Hamas at a distance, did not pledge to help Gaza in a substantive way, as Palestinians had hoped he would. In addition, Hamas profits from the tunnel economy in Gaza. The Islamist government taxes all the materials that pass through the smuggling tunnels. "Tunnel revenue is estimated to provide Hamas with as much as $750 million a year" (Verini, 2012, p. 59) . It is not difficult to conjecture that 
